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Lex and Ius in the Period 
of Transformation1
1. In legal Latin, neither lex nor ius is an unequivocal term; if the discus-
sion were broadened to cover philosophical literature, examples could 
be given in which the meanings of the terms overlap.2 We know of such 
expressions as: lex duoedecim tabularum, lex Rhodia de iactu, lex scrip-
ta, lex perfecta, lex naturalis, or even lex carnis seu lex fomitis, but also 
ius civile, ius itendi, ius cogens, ius naturale. In contemporary disputes 
over the relationship between lex and ius, an intuition emerges, albeit 
vaguely in terms of their meaning3, whereby lex is used for strictly in-
terpreted legal provisions, whereas ius refers to a certain body of legal 
norms considered equitable on the grounds of some acceptable morality. 
In tranquil times, when legislation is judiciously enacted and its 
interpreters are willing to employ the historical interpretation of legal 
texts, the relationship between lex so construed and ius so construed 
may not lead to passionate disputes over discrepancies between the “let-
ter” and “spirit of the law”. Obviously, the times we live in are not of 
1	Translated	 from:	Z.	Ziembiński,	 “Lex” a “ius” w okresie przemian,	 “Państwo	 i	 Prawo”	
1991,	no.	6	by	Tomasz	Żebrowski	and	proofread	by	Stephen	Dersley	and	Ryszard	Reisner.	
The	 translation	 and	 proofreading	were	 financed	 by	 the	Ministry	 of	 Science	 and	Higher	
Education	under	848/2/P-DUN/2018.
2	Cf.	S.	Thomae, Aquinatis Summa Theologica, pars 1a 2ae, quaestio XCV, Art. IV: Lex hu-
mana (…) dividitur in ius gentium et ius civile.
3 An example is provided by a comment of Andrzej Zoll, who discusses (never mind catego-
rial abbreviations) “the relationship between ius and lex or the law we might identify with 
justice and the enacted law that might violate justice”. A. Zoll, Pomiędzy lex a ius, “Tygod-
nik Powszechny” 1991, no. 7, p. 5. 
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that ilk. On the contrary, these are the times of unusual and unprec-
edented transformations. A largely evolutionary passage from the legal 
system formed in the state euphemistically called the state of “real so-
cialism” to the legal system of a democratic state, founded on a social 
system making use of the market economy and political pluralism, is an 
entirely new phenomenon. 
Furthermore, the underlying principles of a new social system are 
not yet clear; what is more, think tanks have not established themselves 
yet as centres capable of drawing up detailed but realistic political 
plans. It would seem that social practice shows that it is easier to impose 
a totalitarian system on a country than to undo such a system. One of the 
reasons for this is the atrophy, as a result of many years of paternalism,4 
of some social attitudes that are necessary for a democratic society to 
function, followed by the disturbance to the healthy circulation of elites, 
not to mention the economic situation the country was in at the outset of 
the transformation. 
2.	For	the	system	of	legal	norms	to	function	properly	in	a	specific	
social system, it is necessary that the former meet two kinds of require-
ments.	Firstly,	the	norms	of	the	system	must	find	axiological	grounds	in	
appropriately ordered values and, therefore, the system must be internal-
ly	cohesive	in	terms	of	content.	Secondly,	and	this	is	only	less	relevant	
at	first	glance,	the	norms	of	this	system	must	enjoy	a	clear	legitimacy	
based on rules determining the normative conception of the sources of 
law in the system. Known as validation rules, they determine what facts, 
in particular what issued acts must be considered as law-making facts in 
the system. Exegesis rules, in turn, specify what norms of conduct should 
be	associated	with	 the	finding	of	given	 facts	 (acts)	 to	be	 law-making	
facts.	These	two	requirements	are	closely	related,	because	specific	value	
judgements prove to be indispensable as premises for the exegesis of 
recognised law-making facts. 
4	For	a	broader	discussion	v.	Z.	Ziembiński,	Wstęp do aksjologii dla prawników, Warszawa 
1990,	pp.	247–249.	
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Both kinds of requirements are met only to a very limited extent by 
the	law	of	the	Republic	of	Poland	currently	in	force.	The	law-making	
acts	from	the	period	of	the	Polish	People’s	Republic	are	superimposed	
by new acts, referring explicitly or implicitly to an entirely different 
system of values, or rather to a sketch of such a system. It is only a pro-
visional system because its values have not settled yet in the minds of 
the political elites, even those of a similar pedigree at one time. Agree-
ment in verbal declarations and condemnation of the system of values 
that	used	to	be	officially	proclaimed	are	not	enough	to	obtain	agreement	
on the merits of a positive action. On the other hand, the interim con-
stitution, namely the 1952 Constitution that has been amended many 
times, accompanied by a “wobbling” conception of the sources of law, 
noticed earlier, and new doctrinal disputes over this matter following 
from the absence of properly drafted transitional provisions, raises nu-
merous doubts about the binding force of a number of regulations and 
the content of the legal norms in force. 
3. To determine whether lex conforms to ius or not, one has to spec-
ify precisely what norms are taken into consideration in a given case. 
When speaking of lex, having in mind a set of norms of conduct for-
mulated in the literally interpreted, properly enacted and not abrogated 
legal provisions of a given country, the composition of this set of norms 
may be determined with only marginal doubts. In contrast, it can be only 
vaguely determined what set of norms is to be binding in a state com-
munity, as legal norms considered morally equitable on the grounds of 
some acceptable morality. Any comparison of the component elements 
of both sets of norms, which are rarely formulated in a precise manner, 
is possible only in a very broad outline. 
If, however, such a comparison is made, then it must be observed 
that the non-conformity of respective norms is not, as a rule, a logical 
inconsistency or a contradiction, wherein one norm, under certain cir-
cumstances, prescribes that something be done while another prohibits 
the	same.	Rather	more	often	it	is	an	opposition,	wherein	that	which	one	
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norm prescribes in certain circumstances prevents the performance of 
other norms enacted in a given system.5 Faced with a contradiction be-
tween the norms enacted by Creon and the others recognised by Anti-
gone,	or	faced	with	the	commands	of	Nazi	law	to	kill	innocent	people,	
which is forbidden by any legitimate law, every man of good will settles 
the question of such a non-conformity of lex and ius in the simplest pos-
sible way: by denying grossly iniquitous norms of written law—even 
if secretly enacted—the name of law. Incidentally, this is a classic tech-
nique of persuasion.6 
However,	 disputes	 arise	 most	 often	 when	 the	 non-conformity	 of	
norms is not so blatant, for instance, in cases of limited praxeologi-
cal non-conformity. They involve situations where it is indeed possible 
for	the	addressee	to	conform	with	all	the	relevant	norms	but	the	fulfil-





It is this character that may be shared by the norms designed to 
attain	divergent	economic,	political	or	educational	objectives.	More-
over, while it is possible to reconstruct in a rather uncontroversial 
manner the objectives of the clearly worded norms of written law, the 
premises serving to specify ius often give rise to ethical and political 
disputes. They revolve around not so much the non-conformity be-
tween lex and ius, but rather the determination of what “breed” of ius 
is to be compared with lex. 
4. With a noticeable rift between lex and ius construed as mentioned 
earlier, two different and radically opposing solutions present them-
5	For	a	broader	discussion,	v.	M.	Piotrowski,	O rodzajach i odmianach niezgodności norm, 
“Studia	Filozoficzne”	1978	no.	11,	pp.	93–103.
6	For	 a	 broader	 discussion,	 v.	 T.	 Pawłowski,	 Tworzenie pojęć i definiowanie w naukach 
społecznych, Warszawa	1978,	pp.	223–243.
7	Cf.	G.	H.	von	Wright,	Norm and Action, London 1963, p. 147.
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selves. On the one hand, there is a solution of extreme positivism (nor-
mativeness) and, on the other, solutions relying on something that could 
be	called	“revolutionary	legal	consciousness”	or	the	juridification	of	the	
conception of natural law. The latter make this or that version of natural 
law	not	a	standard	of	the	moral	rightness	of	specific	positive	law	norms,	
but a set of directly applicable legal norms.8 
Both solutions may be questioned and, what is more, they cannot be 
consistently put into practice. A simplistic positivism, which is located 
in the grotesque imagination of its opponents rather than in actual prac-
tice,	supposedly	identifies	enacted	legal	provisions	with	the	norms	of	the	
legal system, ignoring all the highly complex issues of interpretation. 
This interpretation is considered to be an operation of an exceptional 
character, because the majority of legal provisions are believed to be 
“directly understood”. Thus interpretation is reduced to the simplest 
linguistic rules and the construal of some generally worded directives 
which,	lacking	a	careful	specification	of	their	sense,	do	not	provide	suf-
ficient	grounds	for	adjudicating	actual	cases.	Without	referring	more	or	
less overtly to the values of the “lawmaker” construed by legal dog-
matics, who is idealistically and clearly counterfactually believed to 
be	fully	competent	(proficient)	linguistically,	the	majority	of	legislative	
texts	cannot	be	unequivocally	interpreted.	Moreover,	the	rules	of	natural	
language used to formulate directive expressions are, as a rule, related 
to	 specific	ways	of	making	value	 judgements,	due	 to	 the	emotionally	
tinged expressions they employ. In the long periods of socio-political 
stability, certain evaluative assumptions become stereotypes sui ge-
neris; hence, they are disregarded. This, however, does not stop them 
from playing the role of peculiar enthymemes in legal reasoning. In cri-
ses or at turning points, disregarding such elements of legal reasoning 
may	only	seem	to	eliminate	difficulties,	which,	however,	will	resurface	
in	many	specific	instances	of	the	application	of	law.	
8	For	 the	 position	 of	Thomists	 see	H.	Waśkiewicz,	Prawo naturalne – prawo czy norma 
moralna, “Roczniki	Filozoficzne	KUL”	1970,	v.	XVIII,	no.	2,	pp.	22	ff.	
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Disregarding	 lex scripta in the name of revolutionary legal con-




Incidentally, the revolutionary legal consciousness supposedly showed 
connections	to	the	quite	clearly	outlined	political	doctrine	of	Marxism,	
although its details were only taking shape at that time. Apart from this 
example,	a	reflection	by	St.	Thomas	Aquinas	illustrates	the	point	well.	
He	observed	that	it	was	easier	to	find	a	small	group	of	reasonable	law-
makers than a large number of people who were to apply the law.10 
The radical juxtaposition of natural law and positive human law is, 
at	least	according	to	Thomism,	largely	wrong.	Natural	law,	in	Thomism,	
is understood to comprise above all fundamental principles, and even 
if they are immutable, they nonetheless do not pre-determine unequivo-
cally further consequences that are derived from the principles.11	More-
over, positive law is, in the natural order of things, a necessary supple-
ment and although, as a rule, positive law is derived from the precepts 
of natural law, its norms derive their binding force from the fact of being 
properly enacted by a legitimate authority. If a norm of positive law 
contravenes natural law, the contravention makes the norm non-binding 
in conscience, although it has to be abided by if failure to do so were 
to bring about a greater evil such as public outrage (scandalum) or riots 
(turbatio).12 Furthermore, it is not the task of human law to command 
the performance of any good deeds, nor to forbid all evil deeds.13 Be-
sides,	St.	Thomas	allows	reasonable	dispensation	from	the	observance	
9 Cf. Obshchaya tieoria gosudarstva i prava, v. II, Obshchaja tieoria prava, eds B.C. Petrov 
&	L.	S.	Yavich,	Leningrad	1978,	pp.	148	ff.
10 Summa Theologica 1a 2ae, qu. XCV, art. I. 
11	Cf.	C.	Strzeszewski,	Źródła	naturalno-prawne	harmonii	rozwoju	gospodarczego,	“Roczniki	
Filozoficzne	KUL”	1970,	v.	XVIII,	no.	2,	p.	68.
12 Summa Theologica 1a 2ae qu. XCVI, art. IV: tales leges non obligant in foro conscientiae, 
nisi forte propter vitandum scandalum vel turbationem.
13 Summa Theologica 1a 2ae, qu. XCVI, art. II, III.
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of the commandments of human law by those in authority, in those cases 
where	the	common	good	requires	this.	Hence,	in	St.	Thomas”	opinion,	
invoking natural law when challenging the binding force of a positive 
law norm as wrong is allowable only in some cases.14 Finally, natu-
ral law does not provide detailed solutions, for instance procedural ones, 
which are indispensable for the proper functioning of the contemporary 
legal system. 
5. The ongoing transformation of the axiological premises and the so-
cial	doctrine	on	which	the	legal	system	of	the	Republic	of	Poland	is	to	be	
founded is unusually quick and spontaneous. In the early years of Polish 
People’s	Republic,	 the	 introduction	of	socialist	 legislation	was	spread	
over several years, with the appearances of democratic law-making be-
ing maintained until 1949 (“the actual realisation of the objectives of 
a bourgeois revolution”). In addition, successive legal institutions were 
introduced, presumably according to a well-thought plan. The transfor-
mations occurring now in the opposite direction are being conducted, to 
a considerable but indeterminate degree, under the pressure of fear that 
society will grow impatient. As a matter of fact, society demands not so 
much a change of law as the end to onerous social relations. Thus, in 
our contemporary legislation there are frequent departures from the pru-
dent approach of legislative conservatism15 in favour of a more reckless 
approach	to	lawmaking;	one	guided	by	the	desire	to	achieve	a	specific	
political objective at a given moment. In fact, this kind of “emergency 
legislation” has been operating since as early as 1981, rather than 1989; 
however, its earlier purpose had been to save the existing political order 
through reform, and after 1989 its aim has been—as has become in-
creasingly evident—to radically restructure this order.
14 Summa Theologica 1a 2ae, qu. XCVI, art. IV;  Summa Theologica 1a 2ae, qu. XCVI, 
art. VI: Semper ei qui legi subditur, verba legis servanda sunt, nisi adsit periculum pu-
blici boni, quod si subitum sit, non patiens tantam moram, ut ad superiorem recurri possit, 
praeter verba legis agere licet.
15 Summa Theologica 1a 2ae, qu. XCVII, art. II: Quoniam mutatio legis communi saluti det-
rimentum adferre solet, non semper lex mutanda est, quando aliquid melius occurrit, nisi 
adsit evidens necessitas, aut maxima reipublicae utilitas. 
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A remedy for the inadequacy of the system of legal norms that 
are formally considered binding, one that will work in favour of val-
ues that are acknowledged by society or its political elites, is primarily 
viewed as consisting in changes to legislation, although this is obviously 
not the only means. In some cases it is enough to abrogate some hith-
erto binding provisions, which brings about, depending on the nature of 
these provisions, various changes in the system of legal norms. In many 
cases, a way out can be sought not so much in changes to the exegesis 
of legislative texts (rules of interpretation, inference and collision) but 
simply in a change in the reasons for the use of these rules. Finally, the 
legal doctrine of desuetudo can be elaborated on. This is a doctrine that 
has been left underdeveloped or even suppressed until now. An auxiliary 
remedy may be to make proper use of general clauses included in the 
provisions binding hitherto. 
Furthermore, it must be remembered that the norms of the legal sys-
tem originate not only from legislative enactments; they are also pro-
duced in a complex manner by “general rules of law” developed by the 
authoritative juristic literature and teleological directives based on 
the	observed	regularities	of	phenomena	in	society.	Such	rules	and	direc-
tives are sometimes hardly distinguishable from the principles of social 
coexistence or fair trading or—from another perspective—the principles 
of	good	management	or	 the	proper	 exploitation	of	 specific	 resources,	
etc. The non-conformity between lex and ius may thus be eliminated in 
practice by changing the way in which reference is made to such sec-
ondary factors which shape the legal system. 
5.1. The most radical means of eliminating discrepancies between 
lex construed according to undisputed linguistic rules and ius postulated 
on the grounds of a new system of values is of course the enactment of 
new	 legislation.	However,	 in	practice,	 this	 is	not	a	 simple	solution	 in	
Poland’s	case.	Even	with	highly	efficient	parliamentary	legislative	pro-
cedures, it is not practically possible to change substantial elements of 
the legal system in a technically correct manner in a short period of time. 
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The system has been shaped by the legislation and decrees of the Polish 
People’s	Republic	and	in	part	by	the	legislation	of	pre-WWII	Poland.	
Taking into account the extent to which law interferes in all the spheres 
of contemporary social life, a general abrogation of some category of 
this legislation would cause legal chaos. Besides, the legislation of the 
Polish	People’s	Republic	was	enacted	 in	changing	political	 situations	
and, thus, a distinction should be made between the legal acts that we 
find	useful	according	to	contemporary	criteria	and	others	that	are	detri-
mental or lack any axiological grounds. 
However,	 the	 necessity	 of	 gradually	 changing	 legislation	 brings	
about the discrepancy mentioned earlier between axiological grounds, 
either declared expressis verbis or clearly implied, affecting norms for-
mulated	in	provisions	from	different	periods.	Such	phenomena	occur	to	
some extent even in periods of longer stabilization of the socio-politi-
cal system and become especially troublesome in the periods of radical 
transformations, making it necessary to develop transitional provisions 
with caution, and to suitably elaborate on the rules of exegesis used in 
such periods of upheaval. 
Legislation undergoing such gradual, fragmentary but radical trans-
formations requires much more work on the part of legislators than leg-
islation enacted on a “virgin territory” even if matters of fundamental 
importance are concerned. Incidentally, the drawing up of the Constitu-
tion	proceeded	perhaps	more	efficiently	in	1921	than	in	1991.	More	work	
is required now because legislators need to anticipate what legal prob-
lems may arise when new provisions interact with similar ones which 
date back to an earlier period and remain in force. Of course, legisla-
tive work can be accelerated without worrying about possible structural 
loopholes or obvious incompatibilities between system norms, but the 
social price of such haste turns out to be very burdensome, as can be seen 
with local government legislation. 
Alongside such general praxeological problems that arise with law-
making	activity,	there	are	particular	difficulties	that	are	specific	to	Po-
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any of its assumptions, will soon enter its third decade. As a matter 
of	fact,	this	legislative	crisis,	aggravated	by	the	inflation	of	provisions,	
is not limited to Poland or other former socialist countries. In the case of 
Poland, however, the crisis involves a dysfunctional legislature, which 
is	 not	only	due	 to	 the	unusual	 composition	of	 the	10th	Sejm	and	 the	
small number of parliamentarians with legislative experience. Another 
reason is the sheer amount of proposed legislation. When this state of 
affairs is combined with the absence of clearly outlined general politi-
cal concepts and the political pressure being exerted by various social 
groups lobbying for quick changes to individual fragments of existing 
legal institutions, it entails that the changes in question are not always 
beneficial	for	society	in	general.
5.2.	The	abrogation	of	specific	hitherto	binding	provisions	may	re-
move incompatibilities between lex and ius in various ways, depending 
on their formal character. 
If the provisions served the purpose of formulating substantive norms, 
either	prescribing	or	prohibiting	the	performance	of	specific	acts,	under-
stood simply as psychophysical, their abrogation makes the acts, previ-
ously prescribed or prohibited, indifferent pro futuro. Thus, the original 
freedom	of	conduct	is	restored	in	a	given	field,	provided,	of	course,	that	
other norms in the system do not prescribe the performance of these acts 
or prohibit them, if only indirectly. 
If abrogated provisions formulate norms granting competence (au-
thorisation)	 to	 a	person	 to	perform	 specific	 conventional	 acts,	 having	
a legal effect—starting from law-making competences and ending with 
the capacity of natural persons to perform acts in civil law—the ab-
rogation of such a provision makes acts of this kind, performed from 
a given moment on, suffer from the sanction of nullity, unless the rules 
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for performing such acts become established, for instance, by custom. 
The abrogation of rules constructing certain acts in law at a certain mo-
ment does not affect the legal effectiveness of acts performed earlier, if 
the abrogation of a relevant provision is not combined with an amend-
ment	to	the	regulations	hitherto	binding	in	this	field.	This,	in	turn,	may	
entail intricate problems of retroactivity and retrospection. 
From the point of view of the problem at hand, particularly complex 
are those cases involving abrogated provisions that do not directly for-
mulate norms prescribing or prohibiting the performance of some acts, 
or which do not specify the circumstances in which some acts are to be 
performed—as is the case with competence-granting norms—but rather 
establish the general assumptions on which the institutions of a given 
system are to be founded (by formulating so called “principles of law 
in a descriptive sense”),16 or formulate sui generis	definitions	of	legal	
institutions by referring to their purpose or expected function (role). 
Provisions of this kind are vital for the exegesis of legislative texts, 
since they provide the premises for interpretation and inference rules. 
The abrogation of provisions of this kind—one example is offered by 
the abrogation of the provisions of Chapter II of the Constitution of the 
Polish	People’s	Republic—creates	the	freedom	to	choose	premises	for	
the application of the rules mentioned above, because it eliminates the 
premises of the old legislative text (although the result is by no means 
obvious due to the intricacies of the relationship between these provi-
sions and the results of exegesis). 
5.3. The issues associated with the exegesis of legislative texts 
(i.e.	their	interpretation,	juristic	reasoning	and	elimination	of	conflicts),	
performed as acts of humanistic historical (static) or adaptive (dynamic) 
interpretation, are elementary and as such are discussed in law textbooks 
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sic problems here in detail.17 The changes made to the system of legal 
norms without amending legislative texts, solely through a different ex-
egesis of texts issued earlier, are entirely possible, although changes of 





to be considered as having only historical relevance.18 In addition, 
the	changes	in	the	officially	adopted	results	of	the	exegesis	of	legislative	
texts followed not so much from the adoption of different rules of inter-
pretation or inference (although linguistic rules of interpretation or for-
malised rules of inference were ostentatiously disregarded at that time)19 
as from changes in the premises adopted when applying the traditional 
rules. When referring to both “static” and “dynamic” interpretations, le-
gal dogmatics assumes that the idealizationally construed “legislator” is 
semiotically,	praxeologically	and	axiologically	rational.	However,	this	
“legislator” is attributed, at least in part, different knowledge and dif-
ferent values in these cases, on the basis of better or worse documented 
guesses as to what premises were once adopted by the drafters of given 
provisions or what values and knowledge are attributed to the “current 
legislator” (often identifying reality with proclaimed postulates). 
The issue of reconstructing the knowledge and values attributed to 
the “legislator” by legal dogmaticians is a rather complex one, as it may 
rely on drawing conclusions that are in a certain sense deductive, or on 
formulating hypotheses about the assertions and values that supposedly 
served as axiological grounds for the norms expressed unambiguously in 
17 J. Kmita, Z metodologicznych problemów interpretacji humanistycznej, Warszawa 1971, 
pp.	 81	 ff.;	 L.	Nowak,	 Interpretacja prawnicza. Studium z metodologii prawoznawstwa, 
Warszawa	 1973,	 pp.	 25	 ff.;	M.	Zieliński,	 Interpretacja jako proces dekodowania tekstu 
prawnego, Poznań	1972.
18	Cf.	Resolution	of	the	General	Assembly	of	the	Supreme	Court	of	25	November	1948.
19	Cf.	 S.	 Ehrlich,	 O metodzie formalno-dogmatycznej,	 “Państwo	 i	 Prawo”	 1955,	 no.	 3,	
pp.	374–404.
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legal provisions. Alternatively, such reconstructions may have recourse to 
the	clear	wording	of	legislative	texts,	specifically	their	separate	preambles	
or	 introductory	provisions	 (internal	 preambles),	 defining	 the	 “purpose”	
and/or	“objective”	of	a	statute.	In	the	cases	of	the	first	kind,	it	is	easy	to	
question an explanatory hypothesis by appealing to the “dynamic” (adap-
tive) conception and showing in this or that way how “today”s legislator” 
may	perceive	and	judge	specific	social	phenomena.	However,	when	the	
intellectual and judgemental premises of a statute are formulated expres-
sis verbis, they ought to be rejected if they are inadequate. 
Otherwise the same wording, in a different situation and the altered 
context of other provisions, may take on a substantially different sense. 
The phrase used in Article 85 of the Constitution of the Polish People’s 
Republic	stating	that	trade	unions	“are	a	school	of	civil	activism”	had	
a totally different meaning in the context of the political doctrine pre-
vailing in 1952. It assigned to trade unions the role of one of many 
“transmission belts from the Party to the masses”. The meaning changed 
radically in the wake of the transformations that took place towards the 
end of 1989, if only owing to the change of context whereby “and com-
mitment to the building of a socialist society” was replaced with “and 
commitment to the building of a civil society”. 
The	key	issue	in	fulfilling	the	requirements	of	the	rule	of	law	and	
legal culture in the course of interpretation is not to employ functional 
interpretation in cases where the result of the linguistic interpretation is 
unambiguous. Likewise, if cases of extensive and restrictive interpreta-
tion are allowed, as well as those of rejecting the result of literal inter-
pretation ab inutili sensu, they must be treated as absolute exceptions, 
only to be used when the wording of the text is obviously inadequate to 
the unquestionable directive intentions of the legislators. In the case of 
adopting the conception of static (historical) interpretation, the prob-
lem is relatively clear. In the case of dynamic (adaptive) interpretation, 
which is of greater interest to us here, there is a particularly strong temp-
tation to see the inadequacy or at least “ambiguity” of a legislative text 
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and, in view of this, a temptation to see if it could be interpreted in 
such	a	way	as	 to	make	 it	 contain	 the	norms	 that	 could	find	axiologi-
cal grounds in prevailing knowledge and values. In such situations, the 
problem arises of the choice between the reliability of the legal order 
and the adequacy of axiological grounds. It is a dilemma with regard to 
which	a	specific	doctrinal	stance	should	be	taken,	instead	of	obliterating	
the heart of the matter by seeing linguistic ambiguities where other-
wise	the	legislative	text	would	be	considered	sufficiently	clear.	
The question of the applicability of such or other interpretation 
rules, or rather their relationship in respect of cases involving clear 
incompatibility between literally interpreted lex and postulates con-
cerning ius, must not obscure the most crucial problem in Poland”s 
situation. This problem concerns the organization, at least in a gen-
eral	outline,	of	the	system	of	values	to	which	the	law	of	the	Republic	
of Poland is to be subordinated. The enumeration of these values in 
a	rather	general	way	does	not	suffice,	unless	more	accurate	evaluations	
are	formulated.	They	should	provide	guidance	in	the	cases	of	conflict	
between the freedom and equality of citizens, social justice (in some 
more	specific	meaning)	and	market	economy	principles,	the	reliability	
of	the	legal	order	and	the	flexibility	of	law,	the	consideration	of	merit	
and social utility, etc. 
The question arises of how such a systematisation is to be imple-
mented?	 Parliamentary	 bodies	 may	 adopt	 some	 general	 resolutions	
in this area but cannot make more detailed decisions, determining the 




preferences	 of	 this	 kind	when	 faced	with	 radical	 changes	 to	 official-
ly recognised values, when systemic and political conceptions change 
month by month, and legislative processes do not proceed in an orderly 
manner, in accordance with suitably clear and distinct main premises. 
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At the same time, this is somewhat understandable in such periods of 
upheaval. 
5.4. In times of social upheaval, the role of desuetudo comes to the 
fore as a factor that can bring order to a legal system. Appealing to desue-
tudo as a negative validation rule accepted by the authoritative juristic lit-
erature should have perhaps been discussed earlier, before discussing the 
role	of	exegesis	rules	in	resolving	the	problems	under	discussion.	How-
ever, it has to be realised that desuetudo applies not so much to legal pro-
visions as to the legal norms that have been derived through interpreting 
these provisions, or to norms accepted as legal norms and deriving their 
binding force from custom (in the latter case, the discontinuance of imple-
menting the norms in question is decisive). The authoritative Polish juris-
tic	literature	lacks	any	fully-fledged	conceptions	concerning	desuetudo,20 
but it can be nevertheless assumed that the concept covers situations of 
two	types:	actual	failure	to	implement	specific	norms	(the	failure	of	their	
addressees to obey them and failure of state authorities to impose sanc-
tions for their breach) and the conviction embraced by a growing number 
of lawyers that failure to implement given norms deserves to be toler-
ated or even approved. In traditional jurisprudence, which is suitable for 
a different rate of social transformation than that we are faced with today, 
stress was laid on the element of the “oblivion” of antiquated regulations, 
because it was mainly concerned with customary regulations, dating back 
to the distant past. Today, this element has lost its relevance, while in the 
times	of	the	Polish	People’s	Republic	“campaigns	to	organise	departmen-
tal regulations”, conducted in ways that can hardly be considered properly 
legitimated,	resulted	in	finding	tens	of	thousands	of	regulations	invalid,	
despite the fact that they had not been explicitly abrogated. Desuetudo 
can thus take place without referring to the criterion of particular “antiq-
uity”,	but	the	criteria	for	finding	norms	to	be	“antiquated”	should	not	be	
arbitrary either. 
20	Cf.	 Resolution	 of	 the	 Entire	 Civil	 Chamber	 of	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 of	 12	 Feb.	 1955,	
I CO 4/55. 
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Furthermore, it is necessary to distinguish a category of norms that, 
admittedly, do not directly and logically contravene the constitution-
al norms or others found in high-ranking legislative acts, or that are 
even	not	praxeologically	or	flagrantly	 inconsistent	with	 those	norms,	
but	 which	 find	 no	 axiological	 grounds	 in	 the	 new	 understanding	 of	
knowledge and values. It is pointless for this category of norms to con-
tinue to be in force, and consideration must be given to whether should 
still	be	binding	just	because	they	have	maintained	their	thetic	justifica-
tion by reason of their being formulated in provisions enacted in accor-
dance with competences granted by the Constitution. 
5.5. Provisions may be formulated in a general way that is inappropri-
ate to the demands of the present day, but they still may provide leeway 
for law-applying bodies by explicitly authorising them to use evaluations 
of the concrete consequences of a particular decision when resolving 
cases (type I general clauses) or general assessments and norms with an 
axiological ground (type II general clauses).21 A role analogous to classic 
general	clauses	may	be	played	in	a	legislative	text	by	the	use	of	indefi-
nite phrases, ones that, to be precise, are not evaluative in character but 
in practice are used to evaluate or estimate some state of affairs (“major 
damage”, “serious harm”, “important reasons”, etc.).22 
In cases of this kind, especially ones involving type II general clauses, 
evaluations declared in judicial decisions or even formulated in the juris-
tic literature may help correct the inadequacy of lex to the postulated ius. 
Of course, the policy of using the general clauses contained in the 
provisions of the past cannot be considered as a means of reforming 
the axiologically outdated lex.	However,	it	may	serve	as	a	palliative	of	
sorts when the collisions are less radical.
6. A review of issues related to the inadequacy of lex in relation 
to postulated ius, or actually to the often varied postulates of the legal 
21 Cf. Summa Theologica IIa IIae, qu.	CXX,	art.	I.	
22	For	a	broader	discussion	v.	Z.	Ziembiński,	Stan dyskusji nad problematyką klauzul gener-
alnych, “Państwo	i	Prawo”	1989,	no.	3,	pp.	14–24.
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community as to what legal system should be built under a new system 
of government, has revealed the great complexity of problems encoun-
tered	in	this	field.	What	may	be	embarrassing	in	this	context	is	the	ease	
with which some jurists, who did not limit themselves previously to 
describing the theoretical assumptions of historical materialism but 
declared their full acceptance of it, now disavow the social theories 
of	Marxism	and	change	their	declarations	about	the	preferences	they	
have. Even more dangerous is the fact ideological training, which lasts 
for an entire generation, may cause some individuals to go from one 
extreme	to	the	other.	Specifically,	the	conception	of	the	“state	will	of	
the ruling class” deciding until recently what law is, may be replaced 
with advanced legal nihilism, while formalistic dogmatics (which is 
actually caricatured, rather than described informatively) may be re-
placed	 by	 “good	 judge”	moralising.	 Such	 a	 person	 could	 in	 fact	 be	
very useful, but only hearing cases as a magistrate or sitting on a com-
munity conciliation committee. 
The historical juncture at which the Polish legal system is undergo-
ing radical transformations, incomparable to any restoration of an an-
cient régime,23 is far more complex than in other former socialist coun-
tries, making it necessary to conduct a profound theoretical analysis in 
great haste. Without this, ad hoc legislative changes will be chaotic. 
This situation leads to the formulation of a number of postulates in 
respect of Polish law studies and associated organisational matters: 
(a) It is necessary to conduct a profound theoretical study of the axi-
ological foundations of the contemporary Polish legal system. To do this 
it	is	first	necessary	to	deliberate	on	the	systematisation	of	the	values	the	
law	would	have	to	serve	and	define	the	intellectual	premises	concerning	
the regularities of social life to which the axiological grounds of system 
norms would have to refer. 
23	Cf.	K.	Sójka-Zielińska,	Zasada słuszności wobec teoretycznych założeń kodyfikacyjnych 
XIX w.,	“Państwo	i	Prawo”	1974,	no.	2,	pp.	30–44.	
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(b) It is necessary to develop a clear doctrine on desuetudo and the 
exegesis24	of	former	provisions	in	the	times	of	social	upheaval,	specifi-
cally on collision rules and the relationship between the application of 
linguistic and functional interpretation rules in such situations. 
(c) It appears to be necessary to allow for a broader use of insti-
tutional decisions on the scope of the binding force of individual for-
mer provisions on account of their incompatibility with the axiological 
premises of a new or extensively amended constitution. What is more, 
such institutional decisions should be relatively easy to procure, and 
efficient.	
7.	Finally,	a	metaethical	reflection	is	in	order.	From	the	position	of	eth-
ical acognitivism and the Weberian assumption about the axiological neu-
trality	of	learning,	a	scholarly	discussion	of	values	is	difficult	to	conduct,	
as everybody knows, in a concise way. Any practical activity is usually 
based on taking a cognitivist stance and thus, a non-relativist one, as ethi-
cal relativism provides much weaker stimuli for action. This is absolutely 
understandable. Though it must be remembered that by taking a cognitiv-
ist stance various people, adopting different premises, may reach differ-
ent	conclusions	in	this	field	and	if	they	cannot	be	made	to	change	their	
minds by persuasion or democratic procedures, and thus to thereby arrive 
at decisions on a common course of action, the temptation easily arises to 
deploy argumentum baculinum, which is remembered with resentment. 
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